Simulated portfolio. Everything here is a simulated case study using synthetic data about a fictional company. It is not client work, a real audit, a certification or an assurance opinion.
ASSURANCE: GRC, IT audit, technology risk

Case study 5 / Monitoring demo

Continuous controls monitoring demo (simulated replay)

Simulated. This is a replay of a simulated 31-day feed about a fictional company. No real system, person or account is monitored, and no alert is ever sent. It shows how the audit tests of case study 1 could run every day instead of once.

An audit looks at one moment. This demo re-runs three of the audit's tests every day, tracks each exception until it is fixed, and escalates when the clock runs out.

Diagram: Continuous controls monitoring, simulated daily replay
A 31-day simulated feed becomes a daily snapshot. 3 rules re-run audit tests, exceptions are tracked until resolved, and simulated alerts escalate on SLA breach.

The numbers

31
days monitored (simulated)
35
feed events
11
exceptions detected
6
resolved
5
still open at the end
29
simulated alerts
6
SLA breaches
4.3
mean business days to resolve

Why you can trust the rules: they reconcile with the audit

Run on the original 2026-07-15 extract, the daily rules flag exactly the records the Project 1 audit flagged. A test fails the build if they ever differ.

Reconciliation of the monitor with the audit
RuleAudit test re-performedRecords flagged by the monitorRecords flagged by the auditResult
M-01T-02 (NS-IAM-02), rules R-IAM-01 and R-IAM-02A-0132, A-0171, A-0218, A-0329A-0132, A-0171, A-0218, A-0329Match
M-02T-08 (NS-PAM-01), rule R-IAM-04A-0170, A-0388A-0170, A-0388Match
M-03T-07 (NS-IAM-07), rule R-IAM-05A-0242, A-0390, A-0399A-0242, A-0390, A-0399Match

The monitoring policy (fictional)

Monitoring rules and escalation
RuleWhat it checksSeverityOwnerEscalation on SLA breachThen
M-01Account belongs to a terminated employee, is still Active, and either more than 2 business days have passed since termination or the account has logged in after termination.High (Critical if the account logged in after termination)IT Security ManagerHead of IT OperationsChief Risk Officer
M-02Account has privilege level Admin and is missing the approval ticket, approver or approval date.HighHead of Platform EngineeringHead of IT OperationsChief Risk Officer
M-03Human account with MFA disabled.MediumIT Security ManagerHead of IT OperationsChief Risk Officer

SLA: Critical 1; High 3; Medium 10 business days from first detection before a breach is raised. The second escalation goes to the Chief Risk Officer after twice the SLA (High and Critical only).

Open exceptions over time

Open exceptions per day by ruleDaily count of open exceptions for rules M-01, M-02 and M-03 across 31 simulated days, 2026-10-01 to 2026-10-31. The table below gives every value.0123410-0110-0610-1110-1610-2110-2610-31Date (2026, month-day)M-01M-02M-03
Data table for this chart
Open exceptions per day
DateM-01M-02M-03
2026-10-01120
2026-10-02120
2026-10-03120
2026-10-04120
2026-10-05120
2026-10-06120
2026-10-07120
2026-10-08120
2026-10-09020
2026-10-10020
2026-10-11020
2026-10-12120
2026-10-13131
2026-10-14121
2026-10-15121
2026-10-16011
2026-10-17011
2026-10-18011
2026-10-19110
2026-10-20120
2026-10-21120
2026-10-22120
2026-10-23121
2026-10-24121
2026-10-25121
2026-10-26121
2026-10-27221
2026-10-28221
2026-10-29221
2026-10-30221
2026-10-31221

Health by day

Daily health status by rule: ✓ green, ! amber (an exception is past its SLA), ▲ red (past twice the SLA, or a critical exception is open). Columns are days of October 2026.
Rule2026-10-012026-10-022026-10-032026-10-042026-10-052026-10-062026-10-072026-10-082026-10-092026-10-102026-10-112026-10-122026-10-132026-10-142026-10-152026-10-162026-10-172026-10-182026-10-192026-10-202026-10-212026-10-222026-10-232026-10-242026-10-252026-10-262026-10-272026-10-282026-10-292026-10-302026-10-31
M-01GreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenAmberAmberGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenAmberAmberAmberAmberRedRedRedRedRed
M-02GreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenAmberAmberAmberAmberAmberRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRedRed
M-03GreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreenGreen

Two stories from the replay

The critical one: M-01 A-0237

SYS-04 Reviewer still Active; employee E0070 terminated 2026-10-23; last login 2026-10-27 is AFTER termination. Under the fictional appetite statement, a confirmed login after termination goes straight to the Chief Risk Officer.

The one that stayed open: M-02 A-0388

SYS-05 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2021-04-09). It was already open when monitoring began, so it was flagged on day one and kept escalating (21 business days open by the end of the window). Monitoring does not fix a control; it makes sure nobody can forget that it is broken.

Every exception

Exception log (simulated)
M-02A-0170HighPre-existing2026-10-012026-10-149yesSYS-03 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-03-26)
M-01A-0329HighPre-existing2026-10-012026-10-096yesSYS-04 Developer still Active; employee E0354 terminated 2026-02-13
M-02A-0388HighPre-existing2026-10-01open at end of window21yesSYS-05 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2021-04-09)
M-01A-0176HighNew in window2026-10-122026-10-131noSYS-03 Ledger Accountant still Active; employee E0212 terminated 2026-10-07
M-01A-0269HighNew in window2026-10-132026-10-163noSYS-04 Release Manager still Active; employee E0172 terminated 2026-10-08
M-02A-1003HighNew in window2026-10-132026-10-163noSYS-04 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-10-13)
M-03A-1009MediumNew in window2026-10-132026-10-194noSYS-03 Standard human account has MFA disabled
M-01A-0015HighNew in window2026-10-19open at end of window9yesSYS-01 Support Agent still Active; employee E0052 terminated 2026-10-14
M-02A-1005HighNew in window2026-10-20open at end of window8yesSYS-04 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-10-20)
M-03A-1012MediumNew in window2026-10-23open at end of window5noSYS-01 Standard human account has MFA disabled
M-01A-0237CriticalNew in window2026-10-27open at end of window3yesSYS-04 Reviewer still Active; employee E0070 terminated 2026-10-23; last login 2026-10-27 is AFTER termination

Every alert (simulated, never sent)

Alert log (simulated)
AL-0012026-10-01New exceptionM-02A-0170HighHead of Platform EngineeringAdmin account without documented approval: SYS-03 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-03-26)
AL-0022026-10-01New exceptionM-01A-0329HighIT Security ManagerLeaver account still active past the deadline: SYS-04 Developer still Active; employee E0354 terminated 2026-02-13
AL-0032026-10-01New exceptionM-02A-0388HighHead of Platform EngineeringAdmin account without documented approval: SYS-05 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2021-04-09)
AL-0042026-10-07SLA breach: escalatedM-02A-0170HighHead of IT OperationsOpen 4 business days (SLA 3): SYS-03 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-03-26)
AL-0052026-10-07SLA breach: escalatedM-01A-0329HighHead of IT OperationsOpen 4 business days (SLA 3): SYS-04 Developer still Active; employee E0354 terminated 2026-02-13
AL-0062026-10-07SLA breach: escalatedM-02A-0388HighHead of IT OperationsOpen 4 business days (SLA 3): SYS-05 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2021-04-09)
AL-0072026-10-09ResolvedM-01A-0329InfoIT Security ManagerClosed after 6 business days: SYS-04 Developer still Active; employee E0354 terminated 2026-02-13
AL-0082026-10-12New exceptionM-01A-0176HighIT Security ManagerLeaver account still active past the deadline: SYS-03 Ledger Accountant still Active; employee E0212 terminated 2026-10-07
AL-0092026-10-12Second escalationM-02A-0170HighChief Risk OfficerOpen 7 business days (twice the SLA of 3): SYS-03 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-03-26)
AL-0102026-10-12Second escalationM-02A-0388HighChief Risk OfficerOpen 7 business days (twice the SLA of 3): SYS-05 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2021-04-09)
AL-0112026-10-13New exceptionM-01A-0269HighIT Security ManagerLeaver account still active past the deadline: SYS-04 Release Manager still Active; employee E0172 terminated 2026-10-08
AL-0122026-10-13New exceptionM-02A-1003HighHead of Platform EngineeringAdmin account without documented approval: SYS-04 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-10-13)
AL-0132026-10-13New exceptionM-03A-1009MediumIT Security ManagerHuman account without multi-factor authentication: SYS-03 Standard human account has MFA disabled
AL-0142026-10-13ResolvedM-01A-0176InfoIT Security ManagerClosed after 1 business days: SYS-03 Ledger Accountant still Active; employee E0212 terminated 2026-10-07
AL-0152026-10-14ResolvedM-02A-0170InfoHead of Platform EngineeringClosed after 9 business days: SYS-03 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-03-26)
AL-0162026-10-16ResolvedM-01A-0269InfoIT Security ManagerClosed after 3 business days: SYS-04 Release Manager still Active; employee E0172 terminated 2026-10-08
AL-0172026-10-16ResolvedM-02A-1003InfoHead of Platform EngineeringClosed after 3 business days: SYS-04 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-10-13)
AL-0182026-10-19New exceptionM-01A-0015HighIT Security ManagerLeaver account still active past the deadline: SYS-01 Support Agent still Active; employee E0052 terminated 2026-10-14
AL-0192026-10-19ResolvedM-03A-1009InfoIT Security ManagerClosed after 4 business days: SYS-03 Standard human account has MFA disabled
AL-0202026-10-20New exceptionM-02A-1005HighHead of Platform EngineeringAdmin account without documented approval: SYS-04 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-10-20)
AL-0212026-10-23New exceptionM-03A-1012MediumIT Security ManagerHuman account without multi-factor authentication: SYS-01 Standard human account has MFA disabled
AL-0222026-10-23SLA breach: escalatedM-01A-0015HighHead of IT OperationsOpen 4 business days (SLA 3): SYS-01 Support Agent still Active; employee E0052 terminated 2026-10-14
AL-0232026-10-26SLA breach: escalatedM-02A-1005HighHead of IT OperationsOpen 4 business days (SLA 3): SYS-04 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-10-20)
AL-0242026-10-27New exceptionM-01A-0237CriticalIT Security ManagerLeaver account still active past the deadline: SYS-04 Reviewer still Active; employee E0070 terminated 2026-10-23; last login 2026-10-27 is AFTER termination
AL-0252026-10-27Critical: immediate escalationM-01A-0237CriticalChief Risk OfficerPost-termination login detected: SYS-04 Reviewer still Active; employee E0070 terminated 2026-10-23; last login 2026-10-27 is AFTER termination
AL-0262026-10-28Second escalationM-01A-0015HighChief Risk OfficerOpen 7 business days (twice the SLA of 3): SYS-01 Support Agent still Active; employee E0052 terminated 2026-10-14
AL-0272026-10-29Second escalationM-02A-1005HighChief Risk OfficerOpen 7 business days (twice the SLA of 3): SYS-04 Admin account without documented approval (granted 2026-10-20)
AL-0282026-10-29SLA breach: escalatedM-01A-0237CriticalHead of IT OperationsOpen 2 business days (SLA 1): SYS-04 Reviewer still Active; employee E0070 terminated 2026-10-23; last login 2026-10-27 is AFTER termination
AL-0292026-10-30Second escalationM-01A-0237CriticalChief Risk OfficerOpen 3 business days (twice the SLA of 1): SYS-04 Reviewer still Active; employee E0070 terminated 2026-10-23; last login 2026-10-27 is AFTER termination

How this would run for real

  1. Replace the simulated feed with scheduled read-only extracts from the identity system and the HR termination feed, run on a schedule such as daily at an agreed time.
  2. Keep the same rules, severities and SLAs, agreed with the control owners, and record the rule and data versions with every run (the audit log in case study 5 shows the pattern).
  3. Send alerts through a ticketing or messaging tool, with the owner acknowledging each one, instead of writing a file.
  4. Tune the rules with the owners to limit false alarms, and review the monitor itself periodically, as an auditor would any automated control.

What this demo does not do

Downloads

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